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LEGAL INDETERMINACY, POLITICS,
AND THE SUPREME COURT:

Critical Legal Studies and
Lawrence v. Texas

Tavlor M. Dix

magine a man who holds up a gas station and steals all the money in the drawer and
safe. Or, suppose a man is caught driving while severely inebriated. Lastly, consider a university student who is caught cheating on a final exam. The Western legal worldview which
gives our society security and predictability dictates that the three people in the above
examples should all be punished for their actions; they broke the law-in these cases written
statutes that declare: "If one shall commit A then punishment B will follow-and common
sense, based on the myriad legal experiences that one appropriates through life, says that
the perpetrators should not profit from their crimes. Not only should they not profit,
but society should also reprove them and, through such reprobation, deter them and
society at large from committing the same crimes in the future.
However, not all legal cases are as clear-cut as the previously cited examples seem to be.
\v'hile some interpretations of civil and criminal laws are straightforward and preclude any
protracted debate about their correctness, conflicting statutes and principles can often muddy
the water. For example, if a doctor is prosecuted for assisting his patients in committing
suicide, two principles naturally clash.' Furthermore, similar situations are found in legal
situations involving the separation of church and state and in those times in which one's
actions are taken by one group to be an expression of free speech, while another group
simultaneously takes the same actions as displays of oppression and offense. Suddenly,
abstract principles that our society holds as important are conflicting with a strict interpretation of the statutes. This is not to say that the people in the first examples should be
exonerated without question; they committed wrongdoings and should receive some sort
of punishment. But should certain principles-aiding those in need, promoting equality
and fighting oppression, and striving to educate people from all levels of society-convince
judges to mitigate their punishments?
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Many noted legal theorists claim that a nation's legal system is rarely defined by those
cases that never go to court; in these cases, conflicts are not resolved and overarching
principles are not outlined. Rather, the cases that are adjudicated and decided upon by the
judiciary often define the nature of a nation's legal system. But how are these cases decided,
and what does this say about our modern legal system? What guidelines does the judiciary
follow in the adjudicative process? It is possible that judges an: bound by metaphysical
principles, common agreement, economic utility, or the weight of precedent to make certain decisions. Legal determinism, as this point of view is known, states that, given a certain
case, an external causal chain uses its force to bind the judiciary-thereby controlling the
human decision process.
One modern school of thought rejects the legal deterministic viewpoint and argues that
any appeal to metaphysical principles carries inherent problems. In the twentieth century,
legal realism gave way ro the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, which attacked the
foundation of every prevailing legal theory and claimed that the modern legal process is
intrinsically indeterministic. Not only did the CLS school argue for the indeterminacy of
law, but it also asserted that the legal scene was nothing more than a mere extension of the
political battleground. This essay will exaniine the primary tenets of CLS theory and will
argue, through a study of modern Supreme Court cases, that law is intrinsically indeterminate
and that the modern judicial system is primarily an extension of the political debate.
THE SHAPE OF

CLS

As noted above, the CLS movement was, in its largest scope, a reaction to the idea of legal
determinism that comprised the mainstream of legal thought. Both H.L.A. Hart and
Ronald Dworkin argue that, although law could be open to interpretation at its fringes, the
great majority oflegal cases were closed to interpretation. That is, such cases are primarily
fixed in their outcomes either by a "soundest theory" or by some other method. Such
theorists believe in some form of objectivity surrounding legal adjudication. The CLS
school, however, rejects this notion of objectivity by attacking its metaphysical and epistemological foundations. Roberto Unger attacks those who still uphold the Platonic world
of forms and who claim to have access to an absolute knowledge of the essences of right
and wrong (1975, 130). Because no metaphysical categories are thus preset, any attempt
to describe and understand the world (be it linguistically, scientifically, etc.) can be only
partial, and Unger uses this starring point to make one realize that the way in which we
categorize the world is wholly self-determined (130-31). The implications of Unger's
writings for legal validity are far reaching and destructive; they remove all connection between
laws and reality because "reality is put together by the mind" (I 30). Unger finds fault with
the prevailing legal theories because they are all bound by theory-based concepts-theories
that have internal contradictions that produce paradoxes. Unger does not deny that
theories are beneficial for producing knowledge, but he claims that this knowledge is never
complete. Because theoretical underpinnings always comain some form of incoherence,
total understanding is never possible.
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The metaphysical problems presented by Unger inductively lead to equally important
epistemological problems that demand a response from legal determinists. The chief
among these problems surfaces when a case is presented in which different rules or principles
conflict. The facts of any case may leave room for two different phenomenological appeals
that may invariably demand twu diHerent decisiuns. In criticism of Hart's theories Andrew
Altman argues that in such cases one cannot know which rule is the "correct rule" to use
as the foundational standard (1999, 122). In reaction to Dworkin's claim that one can
ubjectively adjudicate because uf principles that will differentiate between competing rules,
Altman emphatically denies that one can discover any semblance of a "metaptinciple for
assigning weights" among competing rules (133).
Brian Leiter takes the metaphysical and epistemolugical foundations laid by Unger and
Altman and uses them to expand the phenomenological implications of CLS thought. He
agrees that determinism, or "mechanical jurisprudence," cannot hold and that no specific
set uf background conditiuns and rules can produce a causally predetermined uutcome
(Leiter, 275). Keeping in line with realist and CLS tradition, l.eiter argues that law is not
a knowable body of concrete knowledge, existing separate from man and waiting to be
tapped. Instead, law is the creatiun of judicial actiun; law is what judges say it is. In short,
the foundation of law is empirical rather than metaphysical (264).
Leiter argues that realists and proponents of CLS thought agree on two theses. First,
"The law is rationally indeterminate locally nut globally." Second, "The law is causally
indeterminate in the cases where it is rationally indeterminate" (265). The fIrst of these
theses attacks the efficacy of precedence in adjudication because it asserts that no set of
precunditions can demand a certain outcome. This view holds that there are too many conflicting, yet equally legitimate ways of interpreting the sources (statutes, precedent,
principles, etc.) and the facts of any case, thus allowing judges to draw a host of different
conclusions from the same facts. This thesis destroys the value of precedent because
t()rmer cases were not decided mechanically, and precedent, therefore, "can be interpreted
to stand for more than one rule, and so justifY more than one outcome" (266), The second
thesis is merely the logical extension of the first. If the law is rationally indeterminate on some
point, and legal reasons justify more than one decision, then we must look at extra-legal
sources to determine why a judge decided in some particular way (267). The move to
describe law from an extra-legal standpoint results in a normative theory
of law that can only describe what happens. It lacks the power to prescribe what ought
to happen.
What, then, i, law, if not a knowable set of rules that can be used in a predictive fashion? Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz said that war is nothing more than
an extension of politics on the battlefield, and Altman takes the same position with law.
For the CLS school, law is a patchwork of ideologies, pieced together for the benefit of
political parties and special interest groups (Altman 1999, 134). "In other words," Altman
writes, "the spectrum of ideological controversy in politics is reproduced in the law" (134).
Before considering a court case that demonstrates the validity ofCLS theory, I will first show
how the presupposition that law is an extension of political maneuvering dearly infects the
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decisions of those who control the interplay between the highest levels of executive and
judicial power in our country.
THE POlITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL NOMINEES

Given the prevailing philosophical streams of the twentieth century, one should not be
surprised to observe the erosion oflegal philosophy's metaphysicalundcrpinnings. Existentialism, deconstruction ism, and other continental schools of thought all question man's
ability to have absolute knowledge of any concept or category. These philosophies have
caused society to perceive reality in terms other than absolutistic and causal. Instead, reality
is seen in subjective terms of individual power, ambitions, and financial rewards. Against
this backdrop, the structure of our legal system appears to be a vehicle for the realization
of personal and collective political goals.
In tact, the public and the upper echelons of political power both realize that our
nation's courts can be used to formalize political ideologies as law, and this realization has
become more pronounced in the past half century. Not since the nineteenth century, when
the Senate took a far more active role in appointing federal judges, have presidents had to
personally fight, having the real possibility of defeat looming on the horizon, to have their
nominations pass congressional review. Indeed, President Lyndon B. Johnson was the first
president since the pre-Depression era to have a nominee fail to gain senatorial approval.
Johnson anempted to have Abe Fortas elevated to the position of chief justice, bur the
Republicans refused to consider the nomination because Fortas's views were too similar
to those of his predecessor, Earl \XTarren, whose views were particularly damagilig to
Republican ideologies, Ftom this moment, when the modern politicization of judicial
nominees began, political ideologies have dominated the formation process of our nation's
judiciary. Democrats vowed revenge after the Forras fiasco, and they exacted their revenge
by blocking the appointment of Clement Haynsworth, one of Nixon's proteges. As Senator
Gale McGhee, a Democrat, then conceded: "Had there been no Fortas affair ... a man of
Justice Haynsworrh's attainments ... undoubtedly would have been contlrmed" (qtd. in
Shenkman 2001 ),' However, this act only provoked the Nixon Administration to continue the
political games by "tlnd[ingl a good federal judge further south and further to the right
[than Haynsworthl" (Shenkman 2001).
Vying for political ideological supremacy in Washington, far from subsiding, has only
increased in intensity and has aided greatly to the dividing and polarizing of the political
parties. Each believes that "packing" the Court will provide future political dividends.'
However, Washington will likely not admit that it is playing this game, even though any
casual observer can easily note otherwise. For example, take the senatorial furor that has
surrounded President Bush's most recent federal nominees. Filibustering, used by Democratic
senators solely to block judges that they expect to adjudicate in one specific way (tied, of
course, to political affiliation), proves that politicians assume judges are not restrained by
metaphysical principles, but are rather merely pawns of the larger political organizations.
This view casts the Supreme Court of the United States, the one institution vested with the
power to defend and uphold the Constitution and the rule oflaw, as nothing more than an
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extension of the political battleground on which major policy issues are driven by money,
prestige, and pott:ntial votes rather than on a strict interpretation of the law.
The Democrats are not the only group that falls into this camp. Recently, the
Republicans were accused of believing that "judging is an apolitical task only as long as
judges do the right thing by administration lights," even though the Bush Administration
argued that "nominees should not be stalled because of politics and that senators should
confirm qualified judges who will observe the law, irrespective of ideological differences"
("Editorial" 2002). It seems as though the right hand hypocritically calls for apolitical
adjudication, while the left hand otTers federal support to those judges who decide in favor
with the Republican agenda. No real assent to a cognitively tenable body of legal knowledge
is made, and the actions of politicians and judges alike betray that sociological, political, and
personal reasons drive the adj udication process towards rulings that, given the same facts
and rule but viewed by an absolutely external and objective judge (an obvious impossibility),
might not be made otherwise. Is this not one of the key claims of the CLS school of
thought? This state of affairs destroys the notion that the highest Court of the land is a
mere bystander in the dialectic evolution of American culture. Rather, the Court is active
in writing and rewriting laws to fit certain political ideologies, liberal and conservative
alike.
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS

We will now examine a recent case to analyze the remaining tenets of CLS theory. Is
the modern American legal system both rationally and causally indeterminate? Does the
judiciary pick and choose which rules and principles have precedence in a given case?
Does the judiciary act, in defiance of constitutional precedent, as a legislative body?
Finally, is the court really an additional battleground for political supremacy? A review of
Lawrence v. lexas, a case decided in June 2003, will answer these questions.
Lawrence v. Texas considers the case of two men who were caught having consensual
sexual relations, a violation of Texas law at the time. To rule in this case, the Supreme Court
drew on rules and principles outlined in three previous cases: Roe v. Wade, Bowers v. Hardwick,
and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. In Roe, as many know, the
Court gave womell a fundamental right to control every aspect of their pregnancies by
extending federal protection to those who choose to abort their unborn children. Bowers,
ruled in 1986, stares that a Georgia law classifYing sodomy as a criminal act is constitutionally permissible. The ruling in Lflu'renee effectively overturned any precedent set in Bowers.
Casey, ruled in 1992, at heart, reaffirms the holding that the state can not interfere with
the abortion of unborn children, even to the point of striking down provisions that require
spousal consent to abortions. The manner in which the Supreme Court interpreted the
three cases in the Lawrence decision serves as evidence for both the indeterminacy of law
and for the supreme role that political ideology plays in modern adjudication. We will first
examine rational legal indeterminacy.
First, the violation of personal privacy is offered as one of the primary reasons for striking
down the Texas sodomy law in Lawrence (Kennedy 2003). However, beginning with Roe,
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the line of thinking that grants an inalienable right to privacy to all American citizens
is faulty. The right to privaL)' is nut a fundamental right granted by the Constitutiun but is
rather a contrived right produced by the Court, and the Bowers decision upholds this view.
The majority opinion in Bowers pointed out that the Supreme Court rests on dangerous
grounds when it discuvers "new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process
Clause .... The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language ...
of the Cunstitution" (White 1986). Justices can choose either to sec the right as fundamental or not. In either case, conflicting rules are present from the beginning, and the
justices must reach outside of the law to further defend any legal position. One's personal
political leanings would provide the most rational basis for defending ur attacking this right
to privacy, which only strengthens the CLS standpoint that law is fundamentally rationally
indeterminate.
Second, a clause written by Sandra Day O'Connor was used as key defense in the
Lawrence decision. In her majority opinion in CtlSe}, Justice O'Connor wrote that everyone
has "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life" (O'Connor 1992). Using this reasuning, the majority decided
that two consenting adults have the right to decide on the nature of their relationship,
and the State has nu right to interfere in that creative process. However, one can obviously
use the above reasoning to defend nearly any claim abuut civil rights, criminal actions,
actions demanded by religion, and general statements on the nature of reality and
humankind. In the same vein, Anthony Kennedy wrote in his Lawrence opinion: 'As the
Cunstitutiun endures, persuns in every generation can invoke its principle in their uwn search
for greater freedom" (Kennedy 2003). Can anyone who clings to a formalist legal approach
hold that such an interpretation of the Constitution demands a certain course of action?
In essence, the above clauses allow fur any interpretatiun un nearly any subject resulting in
a state of affairs that offers no help to judges and only encourages them to seek extra-legal
sources to base adjudication on, once again showing the rational indeterminacy of law.
Third, Justice Kennedy shows yet another pusitiun in the Lawrence majority opinion
whereupon judges must seek extra-legal help to interpret a legal principle. Kennedy accepts
the principle that rulings should follow traditions that are deeply ingrained in the fabric of
our nation, as do the Justices who dissented, but this legal principle makes no definitive
statement as to how such rulings should be interpreted. The majority used certain
evidence to show that an aversion to sodomy between consenting adults was not an integral
part of American heritage, while the dissenting side used counterevidence to show that the
American public and political machine have always been opposed to such actions. Again,
extra-legal principles and historical evidence are needed to provide grounds for a legal ruling.
The point at issue is that both sides had to resort to historical evidence to interpret
a certain legal principle, and equal, yet diametrically opposed, conclusions were reached.
Even when presented with evidence that would show that sodomy was abhorred by the
constitutional framers and early Americans, Kennedy writes, "In all events we think
that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here" (Kennedy
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2003). The Justice has introduced yet another extra-legal lens through which to view the
case as a whole. By narrowing the temporal requirement of honoring traditions, Kennedy
is able to manipulate the judicial outcome to fit his personal political opinions.
fourth, Kennedy criticizes the legal methodology used to support Bowers and later uses
the same legal principle to support Lfllvrence, which effectively overturned Bowers. He
writes the tollowing:

Bowers' rationale does not withstand carefi.t1 analysis. In his dissenting opinion in Bowers
Justice Stevens came to these conclusions: "... first, the fact that the governing majority
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice." (Supreme Court 2003)
In short, the majority's view on morality should not be a deciding f.1Ctor in the constitutionality of statutes. Nonetheless, the Court majority then reorders its position and says
that Lawrence should be upheld because a majority of citizens has "an emerging awareness"
(Supreme Court 2003) that homosexual acts should not be criminalized. Kennedy is, in
essence, picking and choosing the times when one should allow the principles that form the
majority's opinion to be legalized. If the Bowers Court is not allowed to use an extra-legal
principle to support their case, why is Kennedy then justified in his decisions? It seems that
two mutually exclusive, yet equally rational, conclusions were reached,
Lastly, the Kennedy decision in Lawrence supports rational legal indeterminacy by
accusing the BOll'en Court of "[hJaving misapprehended the claim ofliberty" presented to
them in the 1986 case (Kennedy 2003). This case of rational indeterminacy is blatantly
obvious-the Justices themselves feel that they would have corne to a different conclusion
given the same f.1CtS. The root of this accusation lies in the EICt that Kennedy and his
supporters interpreted the legal definition of "liberty" differently than those who upheld
the Bowen case. Here we see how rationallcgal indeterminacy fuels judicial revisionism and
activism; judges believe their opinions and interpretations are more legally sound and impose
them, in the form of precedent (which is, itself, metaphysically groundless), on ensuing
generations.
Turning to causal legal indeterminacy, one can see that the plethora of conHicting rules
and principles, all subject to equal weight and interpretation, will never dictate a single
course of adjudicative action. In the Lawrence case, causal legal indeterminacy is most evidem when olle realizes the legal implications that stem from the majority's ruling, namely
the overturning of Bowers. In her opinion discussing the ruling in Casq, Justice O'Connor
wrote the tollowing:
(e) The Roe rule's limitation on state power could not be repudiated without serious
inequity to people who, for two decades of economic and social developments, have
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event
that contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives. The Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of
reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain costs of overturning
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Roe for people who have ordered their thinking and living around that case be dismissed. (Pp. 855-56)
(i) Overruling Roe's central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under
stare decisis principles, bur would seriously weaken the Court's capacity (0 exercise the
judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule
of law. (Supreme COurt 1992)
In 1992, O'Connor and the rest of the majority were not willing to sacrifice the
integrity of the Court by overturning precedent decided less than two decades earlier. The
social repercussions would likely be undesirable, and a major cultural upheaval would be
expected should Roe be overturned. Additionally, they found the principle of stare decisisbasically, a respect for precedent-to be seemingly sacrosanct.
In his Lawrence dissention, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote,
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. ... " That was the Court's sententious response barely more than a decade ago, to those seeking to overrule Roe 1'.
Wade [in Casey]. The Court's response today ... is very different. ... I begin with the
Court's surprising readiness to reconsider a decision rendered a mere 17 years ago in
Bowers 1'. Hardwick. ... I do believe that we should be consistent [with precedent]
rather than manipulative in invoking the doctrine .... There [in Casq], when stare
decisis meant preservation of judicially invented abortion rights, the widespread criticism of Roe was strong reason to reaffirm it. (Scalia 2003)
Justice Scalia saw the hypocritical fa<,:ade that the Lawrence majority was acting under,
and his comments shed light on the causal legal indeterminacy that surrounded the COUrt
case. In one situation, the Court was reticent to overturn precedent because liberty found
"no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." Yet in Lawrence, the Court had to rule on moral
rights dealing with sexuality and reproduction, and precedent was swiftly overturned
because of "an emerging awareness" in America's thinking on sex. Just one decade apart,
one ruling defended the sanctity of precedent, while the other erased precedent because of
its harm on "progressive" American social norms. Perhaps causal legal indeterminism's
greatest piece of evidence is Kennedy's statement that "Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today" (Supreme Court 2003). Given all the same rules,
principles, and background information, Kennedy would have decided contrary to the
majority in Bowers. Because adjudication is inherently indeterminate, no given set of
conditions can prescribe a singular judicial outcome.
In all of these examples, the reader should not see any imposition of valuative judgments.
I am not concerned with whether one interpretation is right and one is wrong. The crux of
the argument rests solely with whether a window exists for equally differing legal interpretations that forces Justices to look to extra-legal sources for adjudicative purposes. If it does,
then CLS theory has proven the rational indeterminacy oflaw. Similarly, I do not mean to
judge the correctness of any Court decision, but wish rather to show that, given the same
set of rules, principles, and conditions, judges will arrive at different decisions in different
cases. This displays the second tenet of CLS theory-the causal indeterminacy of law.
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Lawrence clearly demonstrates both the rational and causal indeterminacy oflaw. After
removing the traditional adjudicative foundations, however, one must be prepared to
replace them with another superstructure. [f law is not a causal chain of following statutes,
then what is it? Turning again to the situation in Lmvrmce. the obvious answer seems
to agree with the CLS opinion that law is an extension of the battle between competing
political ideologies. Of course, one might not remove all uncertainty of political influence,
but the preponderance of evidence points towards it as the most dominant force that
manipulates the adjudicative process.
As explained above, the general public and many political leaders believe that law is
influenced by politics. The statements of the Justices themselves also betray this opinion.
The case in Lilwrence quickly became as much about the political rights ofa self-proclaimed
minority group as it did about the legality of a Texas sodomy law. Sandra Day O'Connor
explicitly stated that she ruled to strike the Texas law because doing so protected the rights
of a "politically unpopular group" (qtd. in Scalia 2003). It is well known that the homosexual issue is charged with political ramifications-something that was relatively lacking
twenty years ago-and that people are automatically labeled homophobic, intolerant, or
politically incorrect should they oppose giving any and every right to those who have
homosexual tendencies. Additionally, the Democratic Party has aligned itself with voters
who describe themselves as homosexual, and liberal judges are therefore disinclined to rule
unbvorably ror such voters.
Perhaps the most scathing political accusation directed towards those who compose the
majority in Lawrence comes from a fellow justice, Antonin Scalia. Finding no plausible
distinction between upholding a right to abortion (in Roe) and overruling the condemnation
of homosexuality (in Bowers), Justice Scalia concluded, "Today's opinion is the product of a
Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the
so-called homosexual agenda .... It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in
the culture war" (Scalia 2003). Judicial activism that takes a side on a hot political issue
undoubtedly reveals the political influence that partisan leaders and pladorms exert on the
Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION

One can easily provide counterexamples to those who subscribe to a formalistic theory of
law. Law, especially in those cases that actually reach the courtroom, is not mechanically
determined; judges are not compelled to always adjudicate in a given way; different outcomes, replete with supporting reasons and facts, are always probable in any given situation.
The very fact that the vast majority of federal rulings are not unanimous supports this
theory; different judges rule differently in spite of identical background circumstances and
applicable statutes. The CLS theory, when taken as a theory of adjudication, satisfactorily
explains this phenomenon. Its stress on the indeterminacy oflaw, both rational and causal,
illuminates the need for judges to reach out to extra-legal principles to formulate their rulings.
This essay has shown how the Supreme Court, in the case of Lawrence v. Texas, was forced
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to look beyond the written law to justifY both the majority and minority opinions. Moreover, given the social and political conditions surrounding the ruling, one can confidently
assume that the legal ruling, in this case, was derived from the political battle raging outside
of the Court's chambers.
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ENDNOTES

l. In this case, principle one would be something like: "If person x helps in causing the
death of person y, then person x is guilty of murder." Principle two would read something
like: "If person x no longer has any desire to live, he is free to end his life." Naturally, the
two principles conflict.
2. The basic information in the preceding paragraph was gleaned from the body of his article.
3. "Packing"-a word used often by politicians and the media that betrays the fact that
Justices are merely tools of political advancement who serve the political bosses who
appointed them.
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